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11.1  Introduction 
Today, globalization affects a full range of  political as well as economic 
issues. Globalization is a phenomenon driven by the strategies and behaviors 
of individual economic agents, firms, banks, and people in the pursuit of profit 
and is usually identified with market deregulation, the spread of new informa- 
tion technologies, the intermeshing of  financial markets, and innovations in 
industrial and production systems.' 
Globalization is the most critical and difficult challenge for modem firms. 
It has been observed that the advent of  the globalization phenomenon and a 
crisis of  existing production systems are taking place simultaneously. In the 
increasingly interdependent, complex, and dynamic business environment cre- 
ated through globalization, the major industrial and production systems-the 
American Fordist system, the German Craft system, and even the Japanese 
flexible and lean production system-all  seem to be breaking down and sub- 
ject to reassessment. This is sparking uncertainty about how a successful, mod- 
em firm should be organized and managed. 
The post-Fordist system, a new intra- and interfirm industrial organization 
that emphasizes innovation in work methods and product features, has brought 
the American Fordist mass production system into crisis with its competitive 
strength. The detailed compartmentalization of  tasks and responsibilities in 
the Fordist system hinders application of new information technologies to the 
production process, integration of  all levels of  production and management, 
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and long-term investment in multiskilled workers.* However, even the German 
Craft system, once praised as a critical factor in German economic develop- 
ment,  now  exhibits  rigidities.  Its fixed skill-identity  limits the  speed with 
which new products and technologies  can be introduced, while the bureau- 
cratic elements in the system separate production from the development and 
design lab, as well as isolating various parts of production from one another 
(Hemgel and Sabel 1994). Further, the Japanese flexible and lean production 
system, praised as an important potential alternative to the Fordist system, is 
beginning to show weakness in the new global competitive arena. Its central 
characteristic is a vertical network supported by lifetime and seniority-based 
employment. However, if employment practice or some other part of the busi- 
ness environment changes as the result of  globalization,  as many believe it 
must, the Japanese system will also be pressured to change (Westney 1994). 
This study explores how globalization affects the structure of industrial or- 
ganization in both individual economies and firms; searches for the optimal 
industrial organization, if  any, in the globalized market; and examines future 
directions of structural adjustment in individual economies. However, to dis- 
cuss systematically the implications of  globalization for industrial organiza- 
tion, one has to conceptualize analytically “globalization.” In this study, global- 
ization is characterized as a parameter, similar to a market price. Globalization 
is driven by microeconomic forces but is taken by individual firms as a parame- 
ter in making economic decisions on the optimal structure of industrial organi- 
zation.  While  the  globalization  phenomenon  encompasses  many  diverse 
characteristics  in general, this paper concentrates  only on those  aspects of 
globalization most relevant to the current context and simplifies the concept so 
it can be easily incorporated into the following economic analy~is.~ 
First,  we  identify  the globalization  phenomenon  with  the  integration  of 
world economies into a single market, which in turn implies the following 
specific predictions for market environments: increase of potential market size 
and intensified competition for market share. In this sense, the challenge of 
globalization to individual firms is, on the one hand, how to deal with these 
larger markets. But as a corollary of the extended market size, globalization 
can also mean intensified competition in international as well as domestic mar- 
kets, so that existing monopolistic producers may face the possibility of losing 
their market shares, on the other hand. Therefore, globalization gives access to 
greater market size in general but can also imply reduced market size for firms 
that have been enjoying unfair privileges under closed market environments. 
Second, we identify  the globalization  phenomenon  with the introduction 
and spread of microelectronics-based information technology. Improvements 
2. See Oman (1993, 1994) for further discussion of this point. 
3. See East-West Center (1994); lengthy discussions on various aspects of globalization and the 
structures of  industrial organizations in major developed countries can be found in the volume 
compiled by the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii. However, to some extent this paper 
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in information technology contribute not only to economic integration through 
better telecommunications but also to changes in production technologies and 
managerial relationships among various economic activities. Specifically, it is 
expected that  scope economies among various  economic activities  will be 
strengthened through improved information technology and computer and au- 
tomation systems4  In addition, it may be the case that improved microelectron- 
ics-based information technology tends to create new synergistic managerial 
relationships among formerly unrelated economic activities and reinforces ex- 
isting relationships by improving the information network system, making it 
increasingly difficult to isolate a particular economic activity from other activi- 
ties. So, in this sense, the additional challenge of globalization may be how to 
respond to the enlarged economies of scope among various economic or indus- 
trial activities generated by  the  stronger technological  and managerial  syn- 
ergy effects. 
This study employs a theory of endogenous industrial organization in deriv- 
ing the general implications of globalization for the optimal structure of indus- 
trial organization. This theory will be constructed based on the theory of spe- 
cialization  (Stigler  1968) and  the  theory  of  multiproduct  firms  (Baumol, 
Panzar, and Willig 1982; henceforth, BPW). 
This study extends the discussion to the issue of Korea’s industrial structure 
by applying the general theoretical implications to the Korean case. In Korea, 
economic concentration in large business groups, so-called chaebols, and the 
issue of the optimal structure of industrial organization have long been subjects 
of debate. Not only the evaluation of the current structure but also the future 
direction of optimal structural adjustment for Korea’s chaebol-dominated in- 
dustrial organization have continuously been given the highest priority on the 
industrial policy agenda. It is usually argued that Korean chaebols are exces- 
sively diversified and have grown too big, so that the Korean economy suffers 
from excessive ownership as well as industrial concentration. To curb the pro- 
pensity of the chaebols to diversify and grow too big, many initiatives such as 
policies to promote business specialization and ownership diffusion have been 
undertaken. However, most of those policies have taken the form of regulating 
the business activities of chaebols, such as restrictions on entry, restrictions on 
ownership  concentration  and  mutual  assistance  within  the  same business 
group, restrictions  on bank borrowing,  and measures to encourage business 
specialization, rather than directly attacking the sources or underlying reasons 
for the chaebols’ undesirable behaviors. Those policies have generally been 
4. In general, the source of scope economies is the existence of public inputs, which are similar 
to public goods in consumption. “Information” is intrinsically of a public-input nature; therefore, 
diversification across different industrial activities utilizing the same information will benefit from 
economies of scope. In addition, improvement in computer and  automation technologies will help 
develop multifunctional machinery that will become a public input to various related industrial 
activities, thereby creating or increasing economies of  scope among those activities. All these 
possibilities suggest that economies of scope among economic activities will be strengthened as 
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regarded as unsuccessful in achieving their stated goals, and a consensus seems 
to have been reached regarding the reformulation of industrial policies toward 
large business groups, especially in the emerging globalized economic envi- 
ronment. 
The paper organized as follows. Section 11.2 proposes a theory of endoge- 
nous industrial organization in order to investigate systematically the issues 
rai~ed.~  Section 11.3 applies the theory in order to study the implications of 
globalization for industrial organization. Section 11.4 extends the discussion 
to the structure of  Korea’s industrial organization, adds empirical evidence to 
the discussion by estimating scale and scope economies of Korea’s industrial 
activities, and speculates about future Korean industrial organization in a glob- 
alized market environment. Finally, section  11.5 provides concluding com- 
ments on industrial policy implications and the role of the government in in- 
dustrial structural adjustment in the emerging globalized environment. 
11.2  A Theory of  the Scope of  Industrial Activities 
11.2.1  An Integrated Theory of Endogenous Economic Organization 
Stigler (1968) proposed a theory of the multiproduct firm based on Adam 
Smith’s theory of specialization. He suggested that a multiproduct firm’s scope 
of activities is determined by the interaction of production technology and mar- 
ket size. The most important concept in his theory is the economies of scale 
that characterize the production technology of the relevant industry. 
According to Stigler’s theory, activities subject to economies of  scale tend 
to become detached from the remaining set of activities as the size of the mar- 
ket grows large enough to support a scale of  production that realizes these 
economies. Conversely, activities subject to diseconomies or weak economies 
of scale tend to be integrated in-house. Even activities with economies of scale 
become integrated if  the size of  the market is limited or the remaining set 
of activities exhibits particularly strong diseconomies of  scale that dominate 
the concerned activity’s economies of  scale.6 Therefore, the equilibrium in a 
multiproduct industry consists of firms that either integrate various activities 
in-house or specialize in a single activity or subset of activities, depending on 
market size and the degree of (dis)economies of scale of the different activities. 
BPW developed a theory of the multiproduct firm,  introducing the concept 
5. The theory presented in this section was originally developed in Jwa (1994). 
6. See Stigler (1968): “Certain processes are subject to increasing returns; why does the firm 
not exploit them further and in the process become a monopoly? Because there are other functions 
subject to diminishing returns, and these are, on balance, at least so costly that the average cost of 
the final product does not diminish with output. Then why does the firm not abandon the functions 
subject to increasing returns, allowing another firm (and industry) to specialize in them to take 
full advantage of increasing returns? At a given time these functions may be too small to support 
a specialized firm or firms. The sales of the product may be too small to support a specialized 
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of economies of  scope in addition to economies of scale. According to BPW, 
economies of scope are a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence 
of multiproduct firms (1982,248-49,  props. 9B1 and 9B2). 
To  facilitate discussion, we  formally introduce the concepts of  economies 
of scale and of scope through the following equations: 
(1)  sN  = c(y)  c  y,  *  cc(y), 
i= I 
where S,,,  and S,  measure the economies of scale for the full set of all products 
N and a subset of products T,  respectively. SC, and SC, measure the economies 
of  scope among all products N and between the subset products T and N -  T, 
respectively. C(.) is the cost function; y is the full set of products, y = {  yl,  y2, 
. . . ,  y,};  where y, is the ith product; y, = {  y,, . . . ,  yr, 0, . . . ,  0},  y,-,  = (0, 
. . . , 0,  Y,+~,  . . . ,  y”}, and y, = (0, . . . ,  0,  yz,  0, . . . ,  0). Cz(y)  is the marginal 
cost of y,  and [C(y) -  C(y,-,)]  measures the incremental cost of the subset 7: 
Now, we can formally define economies of scale and scope using equations 
(1)-(4).  S,  > 1 implies overall economies of  scale; S,  = 1 implies constant 
returns to scale; and S,  < 1 implies diseconomies of scale. Similarly, S,  mea- 
sures the product-specific economies of  scale for the subset of  products 7:  If 
t = 1, S,  measures the economies of scale for a single product. Similarly, SC, 
> 0 implies overall economies of scope; SC,  = 0 implies constant returns to 
scope; and SC,  < 0 implies diseconomies of scope. SC,  defines the product- 
specific economies of  scope between the subset of products T and N -  7: If 
t = 1, SC,  defines economies of scope between a single product and the set of 
all other products. 
Using these concepts of economies of scale and of  scope, BPW derived the 
following relationship (1982, 74): 
(5)  s,  = [a,  *  s, + (1 -  a,)  .  S,-,]/[l  -  SC,], 
where 
and S,-,  measures economies of scale for the subset of products N -  7: 
BPW (1982, chap. 9) then discussed the competitive equilibrium configura- 
tion of  a multiproduct industry. As a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of a multiproduct firm, there must exist economies of scope among 
the subsets of products T and N -  T: 318  Sung Hee Jwa 
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(6)  sc, > 0. 
To guarantee that potential economies of scale are fully exhausted in com- 
petitive equilibrium, the measure of overall economies of scale must show con- 
stant returns to scale in the neighborhood of the equilibrium: 
(7)  s,= 1. 
One can integrate Stigler’s intuitive theory of specialization and BPW’s for- 
mal multiproduct firm theory into an endogenous theory of economic organi- 
zation. Equation (5)  can formally be interpreted as the equilibrium relationship 
between  S,  and S,-,,  given the equilibrium conditions S,  = 1 and SC, > 0, 
and can therefore be used as a framework for determining the feasibility of 
various types of multiproduct industry equilibria. 
Figure 11.1 shows a possible classification of various types of equilibria and 
associated ranges of S, and S+,.  The negatively sloped, solid line representing 
equation  (5)  with S,  = 1 and SC,  = 0 (a,  assumed to be 0.5 in this case) 
becomes an important reference line for classification. 
The region  on  and below  this  line can be  called the  multiproduct-firm- 
dominant region. Stigler multiproduct firm  equilibria, in which SC,  = 0 and 
S,,,  = 1, coincide with the line and imply three possible  cases: S,  = 1 and 
S,-,  = 1, S,  > 1 and S,-,  < 1, and S, < 1 and S,-,  > 1. At the same time, 
BPW multiproduct firm equilibria, in which S,  = 1 and SC,  > 0, fall below 
the line and can, therefore, have three different cases: S,  < 1 and S,-,  < 1 
(Region I), S,  > 1 and S,-,  < 1 (Region 11-l), and S,  < 1 and S,-,  > 1 
(Region 11-2). However, in no case are the simultaneous economies of scale 
S, > 1 and S,+,  > 1 feasible in multiproduct firm equilibrium. 319  Globalization and New Industrial Organization 
The region above the line, in which SC,  < 0, could be called the single- 
product-firm-dominant region in which the equilibrium conditions S, = 1 and 
SC, > 0 cannot be satisfied. If  t = 1 in this region, there can simultaneously 
exist single-product firms specializing in T and multiproduct firms with activi- 
ties N -  1, given the multiproduct industry defined as a total set of activities N. 
The question of where the equilibrium points actually fall or what types of 
equilibria can emerge will be determined by the behavior of the industry cost 
surface (i.e., the production technology of the industry). BPW has shown that 
a multiproduct industry can have a representative firm competitive equilibrium 
only under very special assumptions  about the cost surface. Otherwise, an 
equilibrium with  a mixture  of  multiproduct  and  single-product  firms  will 
emerge.’ 
11.2.2  Comparative Statics Exercises 
Changes in Market Size 
One can utilize the framework presented in subsection  11.2.1 to trace out 
the effects of  a change in the scale of production due to a change in market 
demand. In equation (3,  a,  is defined as the share of output-weighted marginal 
costs of a subset of activities Tin the total set of activities N.  Since marginal 
cost is equal to price in competitive equilibrium, a,  can be interpreted as the 
ratio of  the market values of y, to y,,.,,  an increasing function of y, .  Therefore, 
as market demand (size) for the set T of activities increases absolutely or rela- 
tive to the set N - T of activities, the negatively sloped solid line in figure 
11.1 will rotate counterclockwise (i.e., the absolute slope will decline) to the 
dotted line where a, = 0.8, for example, and region 11-1 defined by S, > 1  and 
S,-,  < 1 will become smaller, implying that more activities in the set T of 
increasingly weaker economies of scale tend to become specialized. Under the 
same conditions, region 11-2 defined by S,  < 1 and SN-, > 1 becomes larger, 
implying that more activities in the set N -  T of increasingly stronger econo- 
mies of scale tend to become integrated. Therefore, as market demand for spe- 
cific activities increases, those activities are more likely to be specialized, and 
vice versa-exactly  the implications of the Stigler theory. 
Changes in Production Technology 
In the case in which technological  innovation creates greater degrees of 
economies of scope (SC,), S,  becomes greater than 1 in equation (5). There- 
fore, the adjustment process will be analyzed depending on whether the newly 
created overall economies of scale can be easily exhausted. 
If market size is unlimited or large enough to allow the newly created overall 
economies of scale to be fully exhausted by scale expansion, then a new equi- 
7. See BPW (1982, chap. 9, sec. 9D) for discussions  about the existence and  structure of 
multiproduct competitive equilibria. Propositions 9D6 and 9D7 specify the formal conditions for 
a single representative firm equilibrium. 320  Sung Hee Jwa 
librium with S,  = 1 and a higher SC, will be reestablished. As a result, under 
the new equilibrium, the activities will exhibit weaker scale economies, that 
is, lower S,  and SN-=,  than under the original equilibrium. In terms of figure 
11.1, the line will undergo a parallel shift to the left, which in turn implies that 
only those activities subject to increasingly weaker scale economies remain 
feasible for integration. 
Another possibility is the continuation of disequilibrium due to the limited 
size of  the market, since in this case the newly created overall economies of 
scale, S,,,  > 1, cannot be fully exhausted. If  this case is combined with the 
implication of the Changes in Market Size exercise above, one can draw the 
conclusion that an industry with relatively small market size undergoing active 
technological innovation that creates larger SC, will tend to be subject to non- 
competitive structure with  excessive diversification or  inadequate special- 
ization.8 
Therefore, as the degree of economies of scope among activities increases, 
the optimal scale of those multiactivity organizations and the potential to earn 
supranormal profits will increase, encouraging more multiactivity organiza- 
tions. On the other hand, if  activities that have not been part of multiactivity 
organizations experience a technological innovation that creates new  econo- 
mies of scope with the incumbent activities of those organizations, then they 
tend to be integrated within those organizations. In any case, the stronger or 
newly created economies of  scope will imply the proliferation of multiactiv- 
ity organizations. 
11.3  New Industrial Organization under Globalized Markets 
One can summarize the main implications of the theory in a more simplistic 
way. First, as the size of the market increases, the optimal structure of industrial 
organization will be one with more specialization of activities under econo- 
mies of larger scale and therefore with more specialized larger-size firms. Sec- 
ond, as technological innovation increases the degree of economies of  scope, 
more diversified (multiactivity) firms will be encouraged. One can combine 
these two simple implications to derive an interesting hypothesis about the 
relationship between globalization and new industrial organization. 
Convergence  of  Industrial  Organizations. Every economy will increasingly 
face identical potential market size and an  identical set of available production 
technologies as the borderless global economy emerges. Therefore, as  the 
world economy becomes more integrated and globalized, the optimal struc- 
8. In fact, according to BPW (1982, chap. 7), overall economies of scale, S,  > I, in the neigh- 
borhood of the initial equilibrium are neither necessary nor sufficient for cost subadditivity, which 
implies a natural monopoly. Therefore, while it is clear that the industry with S,  > 1 becomes a 
natural monopoly in the single-product case, we  can only conjecture that a noncompetitive indus- 
trial structure exists for the multiproduct case. 321  Globalization and New Industrial Organization 
tures of  industrial  organization  will converge among individual economies. 
This is because basically every firm in the fully integrated and globalized econ- 
omy will eventually face identical market size and production technologies, 
that is, identical market and production envir~nments.~ 
Of course, individual firms may use their own business strategies, diverging 
from the optimal structure implied by and consistent with potential as well as 
existing market and technological opportunities, but those firms will ultimately 
be defeated by  market conformists. However, there still exists the possibility 
that  alternative structures targeting  various markets could also survive, but 
only if  they conform to the particular  market aimed at-whether  local, na- 
tional, regional, or global. 
Globalization and Large-Scale Production. Globalization is defined as an en- 
largement of potential market size, encouraging specialization of larger-scale 
production under strong economies of scale. According to this implication, one 
cannot definitively argue that the Fordist system will disappear, solely because 
of the largeness of production scale. Activities subject to strong scale econo- 
mies will still survive in the large-scale production system in the globalized 
market environment. 
Market Share Competition and Small-Scale, Multiproduct Production. The in- 
tensified market share competition generated by  globalization may imply re- 
duction of market size for firms that are not successful in global competition. 
At the same time, as already mentioned, innovation in information technology 
increases economies of scope or network economies among various economic 
activities. If technology that reduces the optimal scale of production is intro- 
duced into this situation, the optimal structure of industrial organization may 
be small-scale, multiactivity production, which has been regarded as typical of 
the new post-Fordist, lean and flexible production system. 
Therefore, the background for the new system can be characterized as the 
following: As the market share of Fordist firms is reduced due to intensified 
market competition from new entrants, the large economies of scale that drove 
the old system become a burden, thereby motivating new efforts to amortize 
the large fixed costs associated with achieving the scale economies. These ef- 
forts will eventually help introduce multifunctional machinery, through auto- 
9. This hypothesis may sound too strong if one insists that, for example, the nontradable sector 
will continue to be large and differences in resource endowments among economies will not easily 
disappear even in a fully globalized environment, as one of the commentators, Philip Lowe, sug- 
gested. Takatoshi Ito, the editor of this volume, also raised a similar point. However, what this 
hypothesis really intends to establish is that as firms in different economies face the same eco- 
nomic environment, the fittest survivors in these economies will be similar. In this sense, it can 
easily be understood that the persistent differences in economic environments will entail persistent 
differences in industrial organization. Therefore, the hypothesis amounts to assuming that eco- 
nomic environments, including such aspects as nontradable sector sizes and resource endowments, 
will converge among different economies as the economies become fully globalized. 322  Sung Hee Jwa 
mation and other technological innovation, and multifunctional workers, both 
of  which will help reduce the optimal scale by  redistributing the large fixed 
costs to various multiactivities and at the same time help create strong econo- 
mies of scope among those activities. The outcome will be the so-called small- 
scale, multiproduct flexible system. 
Globalization and the Choices between Large-Scale and Small-Scale Produc- 
tion. According to the arguments made thus far, as the world economy be- 
comes globalized, two opposing forces will emerge. One is the pressure for 
specialization due to growing market size, which may  provide an  improved 
environment for large-scale (i.e., Fordist) production systems. The other is the 
pressure for small-scale production and business diversification due to techno- 
logical innovations creating larger scope economies and intensified market 
share competition, which will continue to provide a favorable environment for 
the new  system. Therefore, globalization does not guarantee the diffusion of 
the new system, as claimed by Oman (1993, 1994). 
While the theory implies a convergence of industrial organization structures 
among national economies as globalization deepens, one cannot predict which 
system, Fordist or post-Fordist, will dominate. Depending on the size of a tar- 
geted market and the nature of technologies adopted by  a particular industry, 
an optimal and efficient industrial and production system for that industry can 
be determined, however. One important result of this discussion is as follows: 
Private sector initiatives normally have a comparative advantage in determin- 
ing the optimal structure for industrial organization in an increasingly global- 
ized world economy. Because authorities are unable to sort out complicated 
implications or mixed signals from globalization phenomena and are unable to 
predict the exact optimal structure, deregulation or liberalization of the domes- 
tic economy may be an effective strategy in responding to globalization. 
11.4  Globalization and Korea's Industrial Structure: 
Issues and Prospects 
In this section, we provide a brief discussion of the Korean industrial struc- 
ture. We  theoretically investigate the underlying forces driving that structure 
and discuss future prospects for the structure by  estimating scale and scope 
economies  of  various  industrial  activities conducted  by  Korean  business 
groups. 
11.4.1  Brief Introduction to the Korean Industrial Structure'" 
In Korea, large business groups called chaebols consist of few lead compa- 
nies and many subsidiary firms in various business areas under the control of 
a single owner-manager and his family members. The Korean industrial struc- 
10. This section benefits greatly from Yo0 (1995). 323  Globalization and New Industrial Organization 
Table 11.1  Chaebol Concentration Ratio: 30 Largest, Mining and 
Manufacturing (percent) 
~  ~  ~~________________ 
Ratio  1977  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Shipments  32.0  39.7  40.7  39.9  40.3  40.2  37.7  36.8  35.7  35.2  35.0 
Valueadded  29.1  30.8  33.2  31.6  33.5  33.1  32.4  31.9  30.4  29.6  30.0 
Fixed assets  -  36.7  37.2  37.1  40.3  39.6  39.1  37.9  37.3  35.3  32.2 
Employment  20.5  19.8  18.6  17.9  18.1  17.6  17.2  17.6  16.9  16.6  16.0 
Sources: Korea Bureau of  Statistics; Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
Table 11.2  Aggregate Concentration Ratio: 100 Largest Firms (percent) 
Korea  Japan  United States  West Germany  Canada 
Ratio  (1990)  (1984)  (1985)  (  1984)  (1983) 
Shipments  37.7  27.3”  -  39.5  - 
Value added  35.1  -  33.0b  24.8  47.1 
Fixed assets  40.8  33.0  49.1  -  52.2 
Source: Yo0 (1995). 
“1980. 
b1982. 
ture has been dominated by  the excessive industrial and ownership concentra- 
tion and business diversification of these chaebols. 
Whether these observations are true is not clear. Nevertheless, Korean policy 
toward industrial organization has been framed on the premise that these ob- 
servations are a true representation of the behavior of chaebols and that, fur- 
thermore, chaebols produce undesirable economic impacts on the efficiency 
of the national economy. 
Table 11.1 reports the economic concentration ratios of the 30 largest chae- 
bols in the mining and manufacturing sector. The numbers suggest that the 
chaebols’  dominance has been declining since the mid-l980s, although the 
absolute degree of  concentration seems still high indeed. To  see whether the 
Korean case is exceptional by international standards, table 11.2 shows interna- 
tional data on aggregate concentration ratios that measure the weight of  the 
100 largest firms in the aggregate economy. This comparison shows that the 
Korean case is in fact not extraordinary. Korea’s concentration ratios in 1990 
are comparable to those of developed countries in the mid-1980s. In the case 
of shipments concentration ratio, Korea’s value is higher than Japan’s for 1980 
but comparable to West Germany’s. In the case of value-added concentration 
ratio, Korea’s value is comparable to that for the United States but much lower 
than Canada’s. Finally, the fixed assets concentration ratio suggests that Japan 
and Korea are low compared to the United States and Canada. 
Table  11.3 reports on the diversification behavior of chaebols. It turns out 324  Sung Hee Jwa 
Table 11.3  Number  of Subsidiaries and Industries of Chuebols 
Industries Covere& 
Chaebol  Subsidiaries”  Financial Companiesb  (average) 
Top 5  210 
Hyundai  49 
Sarnsung  50 
Daewoo  25 
LG  53 
Sunkyung  33 















Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
*June 1994. 
bApril 1993. The numbers include only nonbank financial institutions because a chaebol cannot 
own more than 8 percent of the total outstanding stock of a commercial bank. In the manufacturing 
sector, chaebol companies are concentrated in KSIC 31, 32, 35, 37, 38 industries, although they 
are also present in other industries. 
‘1993. The numbers are counted by two-digit KSIC industries. 
that, on average, each of the five largest chaebols owns 42 subsidiaries, runs 
businesses in 30.4 nonfinancial industries, and owns 4 financial institutions. 
These numbers suggest that the extent of diversification of the largest chaebols 
is indeed extraordinary. 
In addition, table I I .4 is cited from Yang (1  992) to investigate the nature of 
that diversification and to make an international comparison. According to this 
information, chaebols, compared to large firms in major developed countries, 
exhibit the highest weight of technologically unrelated diversification but the 
lowest weight of technologically related diversification. While Korea’s degree 
of diversification is very high among the sample countries, it is slightly lower 
than that of the United States. In sum, this comparison suggests that the overall 
picture of Korea’s diversification vis-2-vis developed countries could be char- 
acterized as a relatively high degree of  diversification and an extraordinarily 
high degree of unrelated diversification. However, Yang ( 1992) observed that 
the overall degree of Korean diversification has been declining over time and 
that larger groups are consistently more diversified than smaller groups, im- 
plying that diversification has been the common chaebol strategy for business 
expansion. It is interesting, in this context, to note that in the United States 
from 1950 to 1975, the diversification behavior of large firms was much the 
same,  with  the  major  means  of  business  expansion being  diversification 
through mergers and acquisitions rather than internal growth (Scherer and Ra- 
venscraft 1984). 
The high degree of business diversification may itself be a reflection of di- 
versified ownership expansion and so could be interpreted as evidence of over- 
all ownership concentration among a small number of people in the national 
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Table 11.4  International Comparison of Degree of Business Diversification 
Based on the Rumelt Method (percent) 
United  United  West 
Korea  Japan  States  Kingdom  Germany  France  Italy 
Qpes  of Diversification"  (1989)  (1973)  (1969)  (1970)  (1970)  (1970)  (1970) 
Specialization  36.8  53.3  35.4  40.0  44.0  48.0  43.0 
(SR > 0.95)  8.2  16.9  6.2  6.0  22.0  16.0  10.0 
(0.95 > SR > 0.7)  28.6  36.4  29.2  34.0  22.0  32.0  33.0 
Diversification  63.2  46.1  64.6  60.0  56.0  52.0  57.2 
(SR < 0.7, RR > 0.7)  6.1  39.9  45.2  54.0  38.0  42.0  52.0 
diversification 
(RR < 0.7)  57.1  6.8  19.4  6.0  18.0  10.0  5.0 
Source: Yang (1992, 13). The estimates are obtained by the method suggested in Rumelt (1986). 
Note: The number of business groups inclusive of  vertical as well as horizontal business groups 
are 11  8 for Japan, 49 for Korea, and 100 for others. 
"SR (specialization ratio) = total revenues of the largest single business /total revenues of a whole 
business group. RR (related ratio) = total revenues of the largest subgroup of related businesses / 





Table 11.5  Within-Group Ownership Concentration: 30 Largest Chaebols 
(percent) 
Ownership  1983.9  1987.4  1989.4  1990.4  1991.4  1992.4  1993.4  1994.4 
Within-group  57.2  56.2  47.2  45.4  46.9  46.1  43.4  42.7 
Subsidiary  40.0  41.1  32.5  31.7  33.0  33.5  33.1  33.0 
Family  17.2  15.1  14.7  13.7  13.9  12.6  10.3  9.7 
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
Note: The table includes 616 subsidiaries of the 30 largest chaebols, out of which 164 companies 
are listed on the stock market as of  the end of  1993, accounting for 56.8 percent of  the total 
equity capital. 
within the business groups themselves. According to these data, within-group 
ownership concentration was, indeed, high but has been declining since the 
mid- 1980s,  which seems consistent with the trend of the chaebol concentration 
ratio observed in table 11.1. Looking at the composition, the family share has 
been  steadily declining, but the share of  subsidiaries through  mutual stock- 
holdings has been stable during the 1990s. These trends could be interpreted 
as a reflection of the following aspects: the rapid expansion of the capital mar- 
ket and the disincentive against individual share expansion in the case of fam- 
ily shares, and the general pattern of business expansion through diversifica- 
tion in the case of subsidiary shares. 326  Sung Hee Jwa 
In sum, the facts about the Korean industrial structure seem to confirm the 
popular concern that it is not only highly concentrated in business and owner- 
ship but also highly diversified over wide areas of business. However, recent 
trends suggest that some of the problematic aspects of the Korean industrial 
structure have been alleviated. Especially, industrial concentration and owner- 
ship concentration are observed to be on the decline, probably reflecting the 
rapid growth of the Korean economy and the increased availability of sources 
of equity capital such as the capital market. In addition, it seems that although 
diversification has been and is still common as means of business expansion, 
it is not growing disproportionately either. Of course, it cannot be denied that 
various government regulations have also played an important role in generat- 
ing these trends. 
Having discussed chaebol behavior, the corrective policies that have  long 
been the subject of continuing controversy are now briefly discussed. One im- 
portant problem with those policies has been the lack of attention paid to the 
substance, that is, the underlying causes, of  chaebol problems and the mea- 
sures needed to correct them. Rather, policies have tried to regulate the symp- 
toms directly but without much success. 
All concerns about the various symptoms of chaebol behavior seem to boil 
down to the single most important phenomenon of excessive, octopus-like di- 
versification.” That is because industrial and ownership concentration will be 
achieved through or will eventually end in business diversification one way or 
the other, and economic concentration due to specialization seems to be re- 
garded as relatively benign and efficiency improving as reflected in the govern- 
ment policy emphasis toward specialization.12  Therefore, regulatory measures 
against diversification have  been the major focus of  anti-chaebol policy, as 
follows: 
Industrial policy instruments such as entry regulations (including a license 
and permit system, ownership regulations, etc.) and business area regulations 
Regulations based on the credit control system, including prior approval re- 
quirements for investment, regulations on the purchase of land, and restric- 
tions on entry into a new line of business 
Investment regulations to rationalize industries and to curb excessive or du- 
plicative investments in many similar industries 
Designation and protection of small and medium-sized firms 
Regulations on total ceilings, such as basket control of credit supply (credit 
control system) and equity investment regulations (Fair Trade Act) 
11.  In  Korea, chaebol diversification behavior has  been  nicknamed  “octopus-like business 
expansion,” emphasizing the excessive degree of  diversification. 
12. Strangely enough, there is a widely held opinion among Korean policymakers that business 
expansion through specialization improves competitiveness but expansion through diversification 
does not. This is the background  for the “industrial area specialization” policy, which is dis- 
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Industrial area specialization policy (introduced in  1991 and reinforced in 
1993): 30 largest chaebols advised to select their “core industries” and “core 
firms,” which then are allowed exemptions or preferential treatment in regu- 
lations such as credit control system, equity investment regulations, and so 
forth 
11.4.2  Underlying Determinants of Korea’s Industrial Structure 
One of the most intriguing aspects of Korean industrial policy, to begin with, 
is that it concentrates attention mainly on how to curb diversification without 
asking why chaebols tend to be so highly diversified. This aspect may explain 
why Korean chaebol policy has been of the symptom regulation type. How- 
ever, why Korean firms are so “excessively” diversified is the most important 
question to be answered before any logically and empirically sound policy 
prescription can be  made.  Only in this way,  can one rationally determine 
whether the current stance of the government’s industrial policy, the industrial 
area specialization policy that is intended to reduce the degree of  business 
diversification of firms, can work or is an optimal policy. 
However, not much serious effort has yet been made to explain the diversi- 
fication behavior of Korean business groups in a systematic way.I3 According 
to the theoretical discussions above, the following factors that form particular 
business environments for Korean business firms can explain the diversifica- 
tion behavior of chaebols. 
First, market size can be a critical factor. If  the market for products subject 
to strong economies of  scale is too small for the potential benefits of  large- 
scale production to be fully exploited, then a relatively high degree of diversi- 
fication will result. Not only has the absolute size of Korea’s domestic market 
been particularly limited, but also the market share of  Korean firms in the 
international market has been low despite Korea’s export promotion strategy 
from its early stage of development. Moreover, governmental support for in- 
dustrial development in the form of easy policy loans gave major firms access 
to larger and larger resources. Therefore, in order to fully exhaust available 
resources, those firms pursued a diversification into various industrial activities 
that turned out to be individually underscaled. 
Second, the degree of economies of  scope among industrial activities can 
be an important factor. Technological innovation during the past 30 years, in- 
cluding information technology, can be argued to have strengthened economies 
of scope or network economies among various industrial activities. This trend 
also promoted the diversification drive among Korean firms by alleviating the 
burden of otherwise inefficient diversification. 
13.  Yang (1992)  has tested an implication of portfolio theory on the behavior of business diversi- 
fication-that  the possibility of reducing the variance of total profits of a business group by diver- 
sifying business activities can be an incentive for diversification-but  has found that the empirical 
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Third, the business environment created by  government policy can be  an 
important factor. As shown in table 11.4, Korean firms diversify into techno- 
logically unrelated areas. This phenomenon cannot be easily analyzed within 
the theoretical framework of section 11.2. In order to explain this phenomenon, 
it seems necessary to grasp the nature of the business environment created by 
government industrial policy during the past 30 years. One salient feature of 
Korea’s interventionistic industrial policy is the government’s  responsibility for 
a firm’s survival once the firm enters a designated business area.I4 Therefore, 
the government has taken every possible measure to revive those firms when- 
ever they became inefficient and in danger of insolvancy. In this environment, 
the best choice for any firm may have been to make a preemptive move into a 
business area that is subject to government entry regulation because, once al- 
lowed to enter, the firm’s survival is guaranteed. 
I believe these three factors, individually or jointly, can explain the behav- 
ioral patterns of Korean firms or groups of firms with regard to business diver- 
sification. Unless these aspects are fully understood,  one cannot determine 
whether the degree of diversification is excessive or not, and further, it will 
be difficult to devise a sensible policy prescription to alleviate the degree of 
diversification if it is indeed excessive. 
Judging from the above discussion, one may say that the current degree of 
diversification is rational given Korea’s particular  business environment, in- 
cluding the pattern of national industrial policy. In this sense, therefore, one 
cannot definitively conclude that the degree of Korean firms’ diversification is 
excessive. Furthermore, even if the government judges the degree of diversifi- 
cation to be excessive for noneconomic reasons, rather the policy prescription 
would not directly set business boundaries for individual firms. One option is 
for the government to make an effort to change the business environment in 
order to induce the desired diversification level of firms. 
For example, if more specialization is desired, then the domestic market can 
be fully opened, and thereby firms’ efforts to globalize their business activities 
can be supported. Furthermore, the government’s policy of  guaranteeing the 
fortunes of  selected firms could be changed so that every firm is responsible 
for its own success or failure. This will help discourage not only so-called 
technologically unrelated diversification but also technologically related diver- 
sification behavior. 
14. During the 1970s, when Korea pursued the so-called heavy and chemical industry promo- 
tion policy, the government actively intervened in selecting the firms or entrepreneurs to do busi- 
ness in specific areas and in providing the means to support them. If those selected firms were in 
danger of going bankrupt, the government intervened in arranging additional financial assistance 
or merger and acquisition procedures to save them. Since the 1980s, this pattern of government 
intervention has been mitigated but remains effective to some extent in a weaker form. The govern- 
ment still has strong influence on who can enter the business in the case of important industries 
such as automobiles, steel, etc. Concerning exit policy, the government has become much more 
lenient in letting noncompetitive firms to go bankrupt in recent years but is still very reluctant to 
see big firms in important industries fail. Therefore, the perception that “once allowed to enter, 
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Therefore, any antidiversification policy directly limiting the realm or range 
of  business activities without correcting the business environment may not be 
effective and will create serious resource misallocation. 
11.4.3  Globalization and Prospects for Korea’s Industrial Structure 
In this section, we estimate the scale and scope economies of industrial ac- 
tivities conducted by  Korean business groups and speculate on future pros- 
pects for industrial organization in a globalized market environment. 
In order to estimate scale and scope economies, first, the following trans- 
log cost function of the 107 largest Korean business groups is estimated using 
1992 and 1993 pooled data collected at the business group (firm) level: 
where C, y, and p represent total costs, output vector, and input price vector, 
respectively, and ao,  a,,  P, ,  Y,~,  S,,, and g,  are all parameters to be estimated; 
E  is a disturbance term. Equation (8) is estimated with the following sets of 
restrictions: symmetry restrictions 
(9)  Yth = Yhr  and  ‘11  = ‘I] 
and linear homogeneity restrictions with respect to input prices 
K  K  K 
,=I  ,=I  ,=I 
(10) cp,  = 1;  CS,,  = 0,1 = 1,  . . . ,  K;  cg,  = 0, i = 1,.  . . ,  N, 
and with the following input share equation: 
(11) 
K  K 
sy  = P,  + c  q/ w,  + c  gl, lny, + 57 
I= I  ,=I 
where SH, is the share of expenditure on thejth input in total cost and E,  is a 
disturbance term. The seemingly unrelated regression method is utilized, but 
one of the share equations should be dropped to avoid linear dependence due 
to the identity &YH,  = 1.  The joint estimation of equations (8) and (1  1) may 
help improve the efficiency of the estimates. 
Business activities are aggregated into seven groups, which are regarded as 
firms’ products, N = 7. The inputs are capital and labor, K = 2, but the capital 
share equation is dropped to avoid linear dependence. However, the rental price 
of  capital input could not be measured and so has to be omitted. It is hoped 
that omitted-variables  problems do not cause any serious bias in the estimation. 
Also, dropping the capital share equation in this case is hoped to alleviate 
possible problems due to the omission of capital input price. The list of product 
variables is reported in table 11.6. The estimation results for the cost function 
are reported in table 11.7. 
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Table 11.6  List of Variables 













Sum of  production  cost, operating  expenses,  and 
nonoperating expenses 
Textiles and wearing apparel 
Chemicals and chemical products 






Total wage fundkotal number of employees 
equations (1)-(4)  are estimated and reported with respective Z-values in table 
11 3.  However, in the case of scale economies, instead of directly estimating 
the definitions given by equations (1) and (2), the inverse of those definitions 
are estimated because of the convenience in estimating Z-values in the latter 
case. Therefore, the interpretations  given to the estimated  scale economies 
should be appropriately changed. 
In addition, to investigate whether  Korea’s industrial  structure has a ten- 
dency  toward  natural  monopoly,  an  estimation  of  the so-called  concept of 
expansion path subadditivity is presented. Expansion path subadditivity (EP- 
SUB), assuming two products, is given as follows: 
(12)  EPSUB = IC(y;4, Y;) + C(Y;,  Y:) - C(Y,,  YJI  1 C(Y,,  Y,), 
where y, = yf + y; and yz = y$ + y:, but ytly;, yylyf, and yIIy2  are not 
necessarily identical. If EPSUB >  0, the industry tends to natural monop01y.~~ 
The estimates of EPSUB are also reported in table 11.8. 
The estimation results for scale and scope economies are especially interest- 
ing and can be summarized and interpreted as follows: 
1.  Almost all products are individually subject to constant returns to scale, 
but overall economies of scale turn out to be very strong. 
2. Not only product-specific economies of scope but also overall economies 
of  scope turn out to be very strong.16 
15. See Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987). They suggested, as a criterion for a natural 
monopoly, the concept of expansion path subadditivity (EPSUB),  which is an improvement on the 
concept of cost subadditivity. EPSUB allows product composition and output scale lo vary freely, 
whereas cost subadditivity can only be defined for a given composition and scale. 
16. See n. 4 for a discussion of the general sources of scope economies. Figuring out the specific 
reasons for scope economies among various industrial activities in the current case would require 
highly technical investigation of  various production technologies, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Table 11.7  Estimation Results of ’Rams-log Cost Function 
Expenditure Share 
Function of Labor Input 
Independent Variable  Cost Function (eq. [8])  (eq. [Ill) 
Constant  5.5841 **  (45.3209)  0.1720**  (9.6800) 
InY,  -0.1026**  (-1.9124)  -0.0003  (-0.2961) 
In Y2  -0.0751**  (-2.3191)  -0.0004  (-0.4062) 
In Y,  -0.0259  (-0.9930)  -0.0011  (- 1.3669) 
In  Y4  -0.0457  (-1.4427)  -0.0019**  (-2.1226) 
In Ys  -0.0177  (-0.4503)  -0.0011  (-1.0597) 
In Y6  0.1176**  (2.9018)  -0.0004  (-0.3918) 
In  Y7  0.0661**  (2.1738)  -0.0049**  (-5.1680) 
In PI  0.1720**  (9.6800)  0.0004  (0.0466) 
1/2 (In yl)’  0.0841**  (6.3163) 
1/2 (In yJ2  0.0564**  (6.7785) 
112 (In yJ2  0.0733**  (11.3061) 
1 /2 (In y,)*  0.0755**  (9.8209) 
1/2 (In yS)*  0.0669**  (6.21  87) 
1/2 (Iny,)’  0.0123  (1.1482) 
112 (In y7)2  0.0329**  (4.0673) 
112 (InpJ2  O.OOO4  (0.0466) 
In Y,  . In y2  -0.0081 **  (-2.4796) 
InY, ’ InY,  -0.0017  (-0.6749) 
Iny, .  In y4  -0.0025  (-0.9510) 
In y1 . In ys  -0.0028  (-0.8272) 
In  YI ‘  In Yb  -0.0050  (- 1.3874) 
In y, .  In y7  -0.0092**  (-2.8799) 
In y2 .  In y,  -0.0021  (-0.8431) 
In  y2 .  In y4  -0.0011  (-0.4173) 
In Y? . In ys  -0.0054**  (-2.2057) 
In y2 .  In y6  ( -  3.8346) 
In y2 . In y7  -0.0010  (-0.3409) 
In y? .  In y4  -0.0062**  (-2.8392) 
In y, .  In ys  -0.0057**  (-2.5835) 
In yi  .  In y,  -0.0075**  (-2.3748) 
In Y, ‘ In Y7  -0.0140**  (-5.8224) 
In Y, .  In yS  -0.01 08**  (-4.61 63) 
In Y4 ‘ In Y6  -0.0154**  (-5.2947) 
In y4 . In Y,  -0.0073**  (-2.8658) 
In  Ys ’ In  Y6  -0.0024  (-0.8665) 
In ys . In y7  -0.0116**  (-4.1005) 
In Yo ’ In Y7  0.0084**  (2.3167) 
I~P,  . lny,  -0.0003  (-0.2961) 
In PI  ’ In Yz  -0.O004  (-0.4062) 
In P, . In y3  -0.0011  (-1.3669) 
In P, . In Y&  -0.0019**  (-2.1226) 
in Pi  . In Y,  -0.001 1  (- 1.0597) 
In P, . In yb  ( -  0.39  1  8) 
In PI  ’ In Y7  -0.0049**  (-5.1680) 
R2  0.9443  0.2099 
SEE  0.3580  0.0442 
D-W  1.8737  1.7491 
-  0.0 125** 
-  0.0004 
- 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are r-values. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level and above. 332  Sung Hee Jwa 
Table 11.8  Estimates of Economies of Scale and Scope 
A. Economies of Scalea 
Overall  Product-Specific Economies of Scale 
Economies 
of Scale  yI  Y2  Y3  Y4  Ys  Yh  Yl 
Estimate  0.4426**  1.7949  0.3129  -25.0824  22.1624  -0.7157  7.2440  8.4100 
S.E.b  0.1476  1.6054  2.0049  86.0283  56.3645  3.0766  10.9291  11.7893 
Z  3.7776  0.4952  -0.3427  -0.3032  0.3755  -0.5577  0.5713  0.6285 
B. Economies of Scope' 
Overall  Product-Specific Economies of Scope 
Economies 
ofscope  y,  YZ  Y3  Y4  YS  Yh  Y7 
Estimate  2.7027*  0.5743**  0.5690**  0.6499**  0.6779*  0.6942**  0.4398*  0.6129 
S.E.b  1.4472  0.2022  0.2166  0.3210  0.3977  0.2702  0.2440  0.4199 
Z  1.8675  2.8402  2.6268  2.0248  1.7043  2.5692  1.8025  1.4595 
C. EPSUB 
EPSUB Id  EPSUB 11' 
Estimate  0.0002  -0.9891** 
S.E.b  0.0002  0.0068 
Z  0.8779  -  145.298 
"A scale economy here is measured by the inverse of the scale economy defined in section 1 I .2. Therefore, 
economies of scale, constant returns to scale, and diseconomies of scale are present if the estimate is less 
than, equal to, or greater than I, respectively, where Z is calculated as [(Estimate -  I)/S.E.]. 
bAsymptotic standard error. 
cEconomies of scope, constant returns to scope, and diseconomies of scope are present if  the estimate in 
greater than, equal to, or less than zero, respectively. 
dEPSUB I  = [C(yy,  y;,  Y;,  Y:,  Y;.  Y:.  Y'";) + c(y;-",  yip, yi-"',  yp.  yl-",  yd-",  ?;-"I  - c(y:, 
y;, y;, Y;, Y;,  YQ,  Y;)]/c(Y;, Y;. Y;,  Y;, Y;,  V;, Y;), where yyrepresents the sample minimum, Y!  represents the 
sample maximum, and f"' = y! -  y;. 
'In  the case of EPSUB 11, the sample mean is substituted for the sample minimum yy  in EPSUB I. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
3.  Strong overall economies of scale may be present even without product- 
specific  economies of  scale because  strong product-specific  economies of 
scope are present. This possibility can be confirmed by the relationship among 
the concepts of  economies of scale and scope given by equation (5). 
4.  Korean business groups' incentive for diversification can be seen to stem 
from particularly strong economies of  scope present among various business 
activities because strong economies of scope imply cost savings through diver- 
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5. There does not seem to be a strong tendency toward natural monopoly in 
the Korean industrial structure since the estimated EPSUB is not significantly 
different from zero in one case (EPSUB I), implying no superiority of larger 
over smaller scale, or significantly less than zero in the other case (EPSUB II), 
implying the superiority of small over large scale. 
6. Globalization may not be effective in driving industrial structure toward 
more specialization because (1) almost all industrial activities are individually 
subject to constant returns to scale, and so the scale of  production and the 
degree of specialization will not be very much affected by globalization in the 
sense of increased market size,” and (2) the economies of scope among indus- 
trial activities that are already strongly present will be further strengthened by 
globalization in the sense of innovation in information technology and microe- 
lectronics. Therefore, there exists the possibility that globalization will further 
strengthen the incentive for diversification over existing industrial activities. 
Furthermore, if domestic-market-oriented chaebols become losers in the mar- 
ket share competition with foreign exporters, they will tend to retreat from 
their existing specializations and move toward more diversification as already 
discussed. However, it is also possible that if globalization brings forth techno- 
logical innovations that create new  economies of  scale for certain industrial 
activities, the specialization of  those activities will be encouraged as the size 
of the market expands. 
The empirical evidence given in this section could be biased and misleading 
because the data are so highly aggregated that the estimated technological rela- 
tionships among the seven groups of industrial activities could be particularly 
difficult to interpret sensibly. Furthermore, the omitted-variables problem due 
to the omission of capital input price could also be a cause for concern in this 
respect. However, having conceded those potential flaws, it is still interesting 
to observe that the actual diversification behavior of Korean business groups is 
not inconsistent with that implied by  empirical measures of  scale and scope 
economies. In other words, the empirical evidence suggests that chaebols in 
more technologically diverse business areas will dominate over specialized 
chaebols in limited lines of business, and the actual pattern of behavior seems 
to confirm this. Therefore, government efforts to reduce the degree of diversi- 
fication may not be effective. 
However, in terms of  the types of  diversification, the empirical evidence 
summarized in item 4,  above, strongly implies that the majority of diversifica- 
tion by Korean firms will be technologically related and so this diversification 
behavior may not be as worrisome as politicians, the general public, and econo- 
mists in Korea believe it to be. But this evidence and its implications are incon- 
17. It  could also be the case that sales increase along the horizontal supply curve even under 
constant returns to scale as the demand curve shifts out. I am indebted to Takatoshi Ito for re- 
minding me of this possibility. However, it is still the case that a firm with constant returns to scale 
will have less incentive to expand when  the demand curve shifts out than one with increasing 
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sistent with the evidence cited in table 1  1.4.18  This empirical discrepancy could 
be an interesting issue to clarify in the future research. 
11.5  Concluding Remarks 
It seems to have become popular recently for governments to experiment 
with one form or another of an industrial policy that has been adopted by suc- 
cessful East ‘isian economies such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.19  This ten- 
dency  becomes  even  more  conspicuous  in  discussions of  possible  policy 
responses to the “unlimited competition” forced by globalization. An increas- 
ingly common view seems to be that the government should help business 
firms successfully compete in the international market-in  particular, that the 
government should intervene, to a large extent, in adjusting industrial structure 
to a globalized competitive environment. 
The arguments made in this study suggest the following implications in rela- 
tion to this new trend in industrial policy. Above all, globalization is a diversi- 
fied and sometimes contradictory phenomenon that has different economic im- 
plications depending on the context. Therefore, it is especially difficult for a 
government to choose a particular industrial structure as optimal for its econ- 
omy. One can further conjecture that economists’ search for an alternative in- 
dustrial organization to the American Fordist, German Craft, and even Japa- 
nese network production systems will not yield any definitive, single answer. 
Therefore, instead of adopting an industrial policy that requires a tremendous 
volume of information and does not easily produce the right solution, an effec- 
tive response to globalization may be to let the market order prevail in dis- 
covering an optimal business structure and, for this, let the private sector freely 
make structural adjustments. 
The basic viewpoint concerning the role of government economic policy 
taken in this paper is based on the Hayekian philosophy.20  There exists a market 
order in the economy that arises endogenously and spontaneously, independent 
of outside intervention. Competition in the market order is a process of  dis- 
covering the optimal outcome. Therefore, one cannot discover or dictate the 
market outcome in advance without going through the competition process. 
According to this view, the government’s role is confined to preserving the 
spontaneity and endogeneity of the market order and cultivating a better envi- 
18. It may be the case that Korea’s unrelated diversification is overstated in table 11.4 as the 
result of using a cutoff relation ratio (0.7) that is too high. Note that a cutoff point of 0.7 was 
recommended by Rumelt (1986). but without much justification. However, no one can tell a priori 
which cutoff number will be right. 
19. A lengthy discussion of the nature and characteristics of industrial policies in those East 
Asian economies is found in World Bank (1993). This study suggests that while government inter- 
vention was helpful under certain conditions, the most important factors in the East Asian Miracle 
were macroeconomic stability and the market-conforming economic policies followed by  these 
economies. 
20. See Hayek (1984, 1989) for his philosophical position on economic policy making. 335  Globalization and New Industrial Organization 
ronment for the working of the market order. To this end, the government may 
establish  a  regime of fair competition in the  economic and social systems 
so that the discovery function of  the market order can be cultivated to the 
maximum. 
To put it concretely, the role of the government in this framework is limited 
to defining the economic and social environments-that  is, determining the 
exogenous variables for the market order, while the determination of the en- 
dogenous variables is left to the market order. If the government wants to in- 
fluence the endogenous variables, it must participate in the market order in the 
same manner as private economic agents, or change the environment or incen- 
tive structure of the market order in such a way as to influence the endogenous 
variables in the desired direction. 
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Comment  Mahani Zainal-Abidin 
Sung Hee Jwa proposes that under the condition of globalization, governments 
can allow their private sectors to respond freely to structural change forces. 
Market expansion and improvement in information technology will induce en- 
dogenous organizational change through economies of  scale and scope, and 
this change will determine firms’ specialization and competitiveness. This pro- 
posal  merits  further examination,  particularly  in the context  of  developing 
countries. 
In many developing countries, for example Malaysia, industrial structure is 
dualistic. The export sector is dominated by  large multinational firms while 
small-scale firms concentrate on the domestic sector. In Malaysia, foreign di- 
rect investment (FDI) constitutes more than half of total investment, and in 
1994, 80 percent of FDI flowed into the manufacturing sector, the largest con- 
tributor to exports. FDI is mainly in the electronics industry. In most cases, one 
could also associate economies of  scale with this pattern; large firms usually 
enjoy increasing returns to scale while smaller ones experience constant re- 
turns. The effect of  globalization on existing production and the subsequent 
reaction through industrial policy must be viewed in this light. 
A large-scale production system will be able to take advantage of globaliza- 
tion conditions-its  capital, skill, and technological capacity will be able to 
respond to competitive forces and its production system will develop increased 
specialization and scope of activities. It is possible that a Fordist system will 
not have to be reorganized into small-scale, multiactivity units but can instead 
become a large-scale specialized system with a very short product cycle. Small 
firms in developing countries, unlike those in developed countries, may  be 
slower to respond. These firms usually engage in low-value-added activities, 
and many may lack full access to information technology and their unskilled 
labor may be incapable of moving to higher-skilled production processes. Fur- 
thermore, very few of these small firms operate or utilize R&D activities. 
In developing countries, this duality can have far more serious implications 
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than in developed ones, in terms of the convergence of  industrial organiza- 
tional structures. The presence of nonhomogeneous firms may mean that the 
increased integration of the world economy will not result in individual econo- 
mies’  moving toward the optimal industrial organizational structure. Those 
firms that can quickly compete and benefit from globalization and internation- 
alization will grow much faster than those that need time to react. The duality 
will persist, and if  convergence finally occurs it will be over a considerable 
adjustment period. 
In  addition, most of  the activities of  multinational corporations in devel- 
oping countries are still at the lower end of  the technology and slulls range, 
while the industrial structure reorganization mainly requires changes at the 
top end of the value-added chain, namely, design and research. In such cases, 
competitive firms will be more likely to move production closer to design cen- 
ters in order to minimize production time and cost. Unless developing coun- 
tries upgrade their technology and skills, their industrial development will lag. 
The above considerations suggest the need for industrial policy to take ac- 
count of  the growth of globalization. As Jwa states, industrial policy among 
newly industrialized economies of identifying sectors to be promoted as “ex- 
ports stars” is most probably inappropriate for coping with globalization. Jwa’s 
proposal, that the private sector determine the direction of  structural adjust- 
ment, is thought to be most suitable to meet this challenge. A liberal environ- 
ment is the best solution to rapid market change; policymakers and government 
take a longer time to respond to changes and should not be deeply involved. 
However, structural adjustments that result from private-sector-led industrial 
policy may not meet the broader needs of  a developing economy. Any indus- 
trial policy has to balance these two objectives: to steer a well-founded indus- 
trial development that can also respond to rapid international reorganization. 
While old production systems aim at minimizing cost for a given product and 
process, the new ones should be geared to continuous improvement. 
A primary objective of most, if not all, industrial policies is to promote com- 
petition. Thus, industrial policies must minimize intervention while strength- 
ening economic foundations such as labor skills and technological capability. 
Laws and regulations that disallow free entry and withdrawal, such as antitrust 
laws, cartels, and overprotection of workers, will delay industrial reorganiza- 
tion. In fact, entry into any industry should be facilitated by the ready availabil- 
ity of credit, competitor information, business services, arrangements for shar- 
ing physical infrastructure, and the existence of a network of suppliers (Best 
1990). In addition, liberalization of financial markets and the tax regime will 
reduce the cost of capital and, thereby, the cost of doing business. 
The new  industrial policy  for both  developed  and  developing countries 
should complement private sector efforts. It should not identify sectors (be- 
cause governments may  not  have  full information about  which  sectors to 
choose, and they are usually slow in reacting to market signals) but should 
provide an environment conducive to industrial growth. Yet, governments have 338  Sung Hee Jwa 
to ensure balanced industrial development that will benefit all sectors of the 
economy. In particular, in an internationally competitive scenario, new indige- 
nous firms developing without any information technology network will be at 
a competitive disadvantage. The government could encourage and facilitate the 
relevant information technology R&D that will help these firms to extend their 
economies of scope. R&D work is often too expensive to be borne by individ- 
ual firms, whereas the use of government resources for this purpose will benefit 
the whole country. 
As mentioned earlier, one aspect of industrial development in developing 
countries that has raised concern is the overdependence on multinationals; can 
successful industrial development be achieved only by large firms? Here, the 
example of  “Third Italy” is worthy of mention because it shows how small 
firms met the challenge and the positive role that can be played by the public 
sector. Developing countries should follow the example of a developed country 
(Italy) where globalization challenges can be met not only by large firms but 
also by small ones. 
“Third Italy,” located in the north central part of Italy, has many groups of 
small firms. Perhaps due to their small size, such firms have entrepreneurial 
tendencies and pursue a strategy of continuous innovation, deploy flexible pro- 
duction methods, and integrate planning  and production  work (Best 1990). 
Ninety percent of the manufacturing firms there employ under  100 persons, 
and they account for 58 percent of the total workforce. Over a third of the 
workforce is self-employed. This region accounts for approximately 10 percent 
of Italy’s exports and is famous for racing cars (Ferrari and Maserati), ceramics 
(40 percent of the world‘s ceramic tile exports), and textiles and clothing (Ben- 
neton). 
Two factors have helped to make this  success  story: firm organizational 
structure and extrafirm institutions. The lead firms that deal with external or- 
ganizations are supported by two layers of internal firms. The first layer com- 
prises traditional firms that produce for the local market. They supply high- 
quality products to the lead firms for centralized production. The second are 
design-dependent firms that carry out  subcontract  work for the lead firms. 
There are also design-independent firms that are not formally linked to the 
production chain. Although the success of “Third Italy” was achieved without 
creating the managerial hierarchy normally found in large organizations, it was 
supported  by  an  interfirm  association  with  public  sector functions. These 
quasi-public, nonprofit associations (e.g., the Confederazione Nazionale dell’ 
Artigionato) are formed to serve specific needs of member firms and are ac- 
countable to the government, but they are managed by the private sector. They 
supply administrative  services and also lobby the government on behalf  of 
their members. 
Thus, the ability of  industrial  structures to meet globalization  challenges 
may not lie just in themselves but in a network of supportive firms and a gov- 
ernment industrial policy that promotes cooperation rather than intervention. 
This paper has raised many very interesting and important issues about fu- 339  Globalization and New Industrial Organization 
ture challenges for industrial organizations and about the optimal way to meet 
these challenges. Their implications  are far-reaching, and these  issues will 
surely be further debated and deliberated. 
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Comment  Philip Lowe 
I found this a very interesting and stimulating paper. It addresses an issue that 
is bound to confront all governments that have run, or have a predilection to 
run, interventionist industrial policies. I think it also has some lessons for gov- 
ernments thinking about the implications of globalization for the formulation 
of domestic antitrust policy. 
As I interpret it, the central argument of this paper is that attempts by the 
Korean authorities “to encourage” a greater degree of industrial specialization 
may be unwise because there is no reason to believe that government officials 
are in a better position than the private sector to determine what is the optimal 
structure of a firm. Instead, governments should be creating an environment 
that does not distort private decisions about organization structure. The conclu- 
sion that is drawn is that deregulation of the economy may be the best response 
to globalization and that the government should not be trying to engineer a 
particular form of industrial organization. 
The paper argues that globalization will surely affect the optimal organiza- 
tional structure of firms, but we are not sure in which way, and its impact will 
differ across industries depending on their cost structures. On the one hand, by 
allowing firms to exploit larger economies of  scale, globalization  might be 
expected to lead to fewer multiproduct  firms, with  more specialized  large 
firms. On the other hand, the increased economies of scope that accompany 
the twin processes of globalization and improvements in information technol- 
ogy will lead to more multiproduct organizations. Either way, the prediction 
seems to be that globalization will lead to larger firms. 
I find it difficult to disagree with the broad conclusions of the paper-dereg- 
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ulation is a good idea, and globalization makes it an even better idea. However, 
like a good economist I have two hands-just  as deregulation of the financial 
sectors in many countries led to a number of unexpected and unwelcome con- 
sequences, the same is possible here. This does not mean that it should not be 
done, but rather, it means that one needs to be careful. 
The starting point from which deregulation occurs is important. Given that 
Korea starts with such a concentrated industrial structure, there is no guarantee 
that the private deregulated market will necessarily end up at the optimal in- 
dustrial structure, whatever that is. The conglomerates may be able to use their 
market strength to protect their own position from changes that are in the best 
interests of the economy. Certainly, antitrust authorities in a number of coun- 
tries do not see it as in their country’s interest to leave the industrial structure 
to be determined completely by the “free market.” 
Suppose for the sake of  argument that the optimal industrial structure for 
the production of  intermediate goods is one like Taiwan’s, with many  small- 
scale horizontally integrated enterprises (see Rodrik 1988; Feenstra, Yang, and 
Hamilton 1993). Given that Korea is not starting with  a clean slate in that 
large conglomerates already exist-and  they exist not as the result of market 
outcomes but because of government intervention-would  this optimal organi- 
zational structure come to exist in Korea if left solely to the free market? I do 
not know what the answer is, but there are reasons to suspect it is no! The 
conglomerates enjoy ready-made customer markets, contacts, and easier ac- 
cess to finance. This may make it harder for small firms producing innovative 
intermediate goods to establish themselves in the market. 
The financial depth of the conglomerates also allows them to withstand mar- 
ket forces for structural change for a lengthy period of  time. This may  not 
be in the country’s best interest. To  my  mind, the financial structure of  the 
conglomerates is one of  the areas where they have  the greatest potential to 
cause difficulties-in  a way,  one can think about the problem as a negative 
economy of scope. 
The relationships within the group allow individual enterprises to run with 
higher levels of debt than would otherwise have been the case. They also allow 
long-term planning so that investment decisions need not be influenced by 
short-term funding problems or fluctuations in demand. This is often seen, 
quite rightly, as a considerable advantage. However, it brings with it a danger, 
a danger that is probably increased with internationalization. The danger is an 
increased susceptibility to shocks. The high level of leverage makes it more 
difficult to deal with various types of shocks and thus poses a risk to economic 
stability. The financial arrangements also create the possibility of less than ob- 
jective monitoring of  firms’ decisions. As the economy becomes increasingly 
integrated  into  the  world  economy,  external  shocks-for  example,  !arge 
changes in the exchange rate or a world recession-tend  to become more im- 
portant. High levels of debt can make it difficult to weather these macroeco- 
nomic shocks and can therefore increase the potential instability of  the econ- 
omy. What is going on now in Japan might have lessons in this regard. 341  Globalization and New Industrial Organization 
In thinking about the role that the government should play in promoting the 
most advantageous industrial structure, the privatization  debates and experi- 
ences in a number of countries are also instructive. Over the past decade and a 
half, numerous governments have decided that large state-owned monopolies 
were not providing  efficient low-cost, high-quality  services. While the prin- 
ciple that the relevant activities are best undertaken  by the private sector was 
widely accepted, governments did not just simply privatize the existing govern- 
ment monopoly. In many  cases, they broke down the monopoly  directly or 
gavehold licences to other private providers so that there were multiple firms 
providing the services or goods. Competition among the various firms has of- 
ten been the key to gaining the large efficiency dividend. 
I do not feel qualified to provide any prescriptions for the Korean situation. 
It is sufficient to say  that governments  do have a role to play  in creating an 
environment in which the free market delivers the highest gains from global- 
ization. If the government steps back and is agnostic about industrial structure, 
we may end up with the right answer, but there is a strong chance that we will 
not. Antitrust departments around the world are evidence that governments find 
it in their interest to at least set some of the parameters within which competi- 
tion occurs. 
The following comments relate to specific points made in the paper. The 
paper argues that the spread of information technologies and globalization are 
inextricably linked. While I am not sure which way  the causation goes, the 
argument is surely right. Where I think there is more room for question is the 
next  step in the argument; that is, improvements in information technology 
lead to stronger economies of scope between various economic activities and, 
thus, make it increasingly difficult to isolate a particular activity from other 
activities. I found this a thought-provoking proposition, but I would have liked 
to have seen a few examples and some more details of the type of economies 
of  scope that Jwa has in mind. While the argument may well be right, it is 
possible that improvements in information technologies might actually reduce 
economies of scope. 
Let me provide an example. The increased use of computerized information 
technology makes it easier for firms to prepare detailed information on their 
operations. This information is obviously useful internally but may  also be 
useful to other firms and financial institutions with which one is dealing. If this 
is the  case, it may  reduce the need  for the monitoring of  firms to be done 
internally. By improving information flows, firms may have greater access to 
external funding from unrelated sources. Given the importance that the financ- 
ing side has played in the development of the conglomerates, better informa- 
tion flows may weaken the rationale for the existence of the conglomerates. 
One area where I think that globalization may actually increase economies 
of scope is unrelated to information technology. When firms enter foreign mar- 
kets, brand or name recognition can sometimes be very important. If a firm is 
unknown, has no distribution network, and has limited information about the 
structure of the foreign market, entry can be quite difficult. On the other hand, 342  Sung Hee Jwa 
if  a conglomerate has entered a market with a particular product and estab- 
lished name recognition, it may be easier for it to enter with an unrelated prod- 
uct later on. If, for example, Samsung develops a car for export, previous suc- 
cess in  exporting consumer electronics may  make  it easier to  establish a 
position in the auto market. People know and trust the brand name “Samsung.” 
In a world where product differentiation within a product group is becoming 
more and more important, name recognition is also likely to become more 
important. There may also be economies of scope in terms of information col- 
lection by  the firm. Conglomerates may be able to pass market intelligence 
information between divisions more easily and cheaply than could unrelated 
firms. To  the extent that  obtaining and assessing knowledge about foreign 
markets represents a substantial cost, information economies of scope may be 
quite important. 
On the empirical work in the paper I have only a few minor comments. First, 
the only cost of production included in the estimated trans-log cost function is 
labor costs. I appreciate the difficulties of getting a good measure of the cost 
of capital. However, the paper does not discuss raw materials costs, which tend 
to account for a fair share of manufacturing costs. Given the importance of raw 
materials, a couple of price indexes for key raw material inputs might be use- 
fully included in the estimated equation. 
The second issue is whether all firms lie on the minimum cost curve. I know 
that in the finance industry differences in costs between firms of a given size 
and product mix are considerably larger than differences caused by scale econ- 
omies. I do not know whether this is the case in Korean manufacturing, but it 
may be worth exploring. Having said that, in the finance industry, taking ac- 
count of differences in “X-inefficiency” through using fixed effects estimation 
or other techniques makes little difference to conclusions about economies of 
scale and scope. 
Third, in the discussion of the empirical results I would like to have seen a 
little more discussion of why there are such strong and consistent economies 
of scope. In which industries are these economies of scope strongest, and what 
is it about the production technology that gives rise to these economies? How 
does increasing globalization affect these economies of  scope? 
Finally, one minor point. In section 11.3 it is argued that as the world econ- 
omy becomes more integrated, the optimal structure of industrial organization 
will converge across countries. I am not so sure about this for two reasons. 
First, despite the trend to globalization, many  industries remain nontradable. 
In the nontraded industries, customs and institutions can be important. If these 
differ across countries or demand for various nontraded goods differs across 
counties, industrial structures may well also differ. A related point is that de- 
spite the growth in world trade, many industries in the economy are not subject 
to international competition. A consequence of  this is that the existence of 
international competition should not be used to justify complacency about the 
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firms providing goods or services. The second, and probably more important, 
reason that I am doubtful about the convergence of optimal industrial struc- 
tures is that each country has a different set of resource endowments. Different 
resource endowments mean that countries produce different goods. The fact 
that the product  mix is different may well mean that the optimal industrial 
structure is also different. 
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